GitHub Agentic Workflows

Soon: AgentHub Git Workflows

Not confirmed that it's by Github, phishy domain.

Alternative, less phishy link: https://github.com/github/gh-aw

This is on GitHub's official account. For some reason GitHub is deploying this on GitHub pages without a different domain?

Go: check

YAML: check

Markdown: check

Wrong level of abstraction: check

Shit slop which will be irrelevant in less than a year time: check

Manager was not PIP'd: check

I feel like this solution hallucinated the concept of Workflow Lock File (.lock.yml), which is not available in Github Actions. This is a missing feature that would solve the security risk of changing git tag references when calling to actions like utility@v1

Link to github.com: https://github.github.com/gh-aw/

Does this products directly compete with GitHub Models [1]?

[1] https://github.com/marketplace?type=models

I find this confusing: I can see the value in having an LLM assist you in developing a CI/CD workflow, but why would you want one involved in any continuous degree with your CI/CD? Perhaps it’s not as bad as that given that there’s a “compilation” phase, but the value add there isn’t super clear either (why would I check in both the markdown and the generated workflow; should I always regenerate from the markdown when I need changes, etc.).

Given GitHub’s already lackluster reputation around security in GHA, I think I’d like to see them address some of GHA’s fundamental weaknesses before layering additional abstractions atop it.

GitHub fix your uptime then come talk to me about agentic workflows

It looks like it does have an MCP Gateway https://github.com/github/gh-aw-mcpg so I may see how well it works with my MCP server. One of the components mine makes are agent elements with my own permissioning, security, memory, and skills. I put explicit programatic hard stops on my agents if they do something that is dangerous or destructive.

As for the domain, this is the same account that has been hosting Github projects for more than a decade. Pretty sure it is legit. Org ID is 9,919 from 2008.

Stuffing agents somewhere they don't belong rather than making the system work better with the agents people already use. Obvious marketing driven cash grab.

since generation is not deterministic, how do they verify the lock file?

Somehow i want to ask what's the actual job of those former software engineers. Agents everywhere, on your local machine, in the pipeline, on the servers, and they are doing everything. Yes, the specs also.

Github should focus on getting their core offerings in shape first.

I stopped using GH actions when I ran into this issue: https://github.com/orgs/community/discussions/151956#discuss...

That was almost a year ago and to this date I still get updates of people falling into the same issue.

This is an extension for the gh cli that takes markdown files as input and creates github actions workflow files from them. Not just any workflow files, but 1000-line beasts that you'll need an LLM to explain what they do.

I tried out `gh aw init` and hit Y at the wrong prompt. It created a COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN on the github repo I happened to be in presumably with a token from my account. That's something that really should have an extra confirmation.

I’d appreciate if they fix the log viewer in GH actions. That would have a larger impact, by far.

Ah yes, lovely. That's what I want in my CI/CD...hallucinations that then churn through I don't know how many tokens trying to "fix it".

The landing page doesn't make it clear to me what value this is providing to me (as a user). I see all of these things that I can theoretically do, but I don't see (1) actual examples of those things (2) how this specific agentic workflow helps.

Surely this won't be a security nightmare.

I want to see where we're at in 2 years, because these last couple of months have been pretty chaotic (but in a good sense) in terms of agents doing things with other agents. I think this is the real wake-up-call, that these dumb and error-prone agents can do self-correcting teamwork, which they will hopefully do for us.

Two years, then we'll know if and how this industry has completely been revolutionized.

By then we'd probably have an AGI emulator, emulated through agents.

I noticed this unusual line in go.mod and got curious why it is using replace for this (typically you would `go get github.com/Masterminds/semver/v3@v3.4.0` instead).

  replace github.com/Masterminds/semver/v3 => github.com/Masterminds/semver/v3 v3.4.0

I found this very questionable PR[0]. It appears to have been triggered by dependabot creating an issue for a version upgrade -- which is probably unnecessary to begin with. The copilot agent then implemented that by adding a replace statement, which is not how you are supposed to do this. It also included some seemingly-unrelated changes. The copilot reviewer called out the unrelated changes, but the human maintainer apparently didn't notice and merged anyway.

There is just so much going wrong here.

[0] https://github.com/github/gh-aw/pull/4469

This is a solid step forward on execution safety for agentic workflows. Permissions, sandboxing, MCP allowlists, and output sanitization all matter. But the harder, still unsolved problem is decision validation, not execution constraints. Most real failures come from agents doing authorized but wrong things with high confidence. Hallucinations, shallow agreement, or optimizing for speed while staying inside the permission box.

I’m working on an open source project called consensus-tools that sits above systems like this and focuses on that gap. Agents do not just act, they stake on decisions. Multiple agents or agents plus humans evaluate actions independently, and bad decisions have real cost. This reduces guessing, slows risky actions, and forces higher confidence for security sensitive decisions. Execution answers what an agent can do. Consensus answers how sure we are that it should do it.